January 26, 2005: Our Role In Tamil Terror
Our role in Tamil terror
Martin Collacott
National Post
Wednesday, January 26, 2005
In the wake of the Boxing Day tsunami that ravaged Sri Lanka, hope emerged that the shared relief effort might help the country's Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority end their civil war. Regrettably, a close reading of statements made by leaders on both sides — particularly the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a.k.a. the Tamil Tigers — suggests these hopes are misplaced. It seems unlikely that peace talks will resume between the two sides. And Canada must bear a large part of the blame.
The roots of Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict go back to the 1950s, when demagogic Sinhalese politicians sought to gain political support at the expense of minority groups, particularly the Tamils. Whenever the party in power attempted to make meaningful concessions to the Tamils, the opposition undermined such moves by stirring up Sinhalese nationalism. Though the Tamils have won many rights in recent years, rivalry between the two main Sinhalese-dominated political parties continues to complicate resolution of the ongoing conflict.
On the Tamil side, the situation is even less encouraging. In his recent statements, the head of the political wing of the Tigers, S.P. Thamilselvan, has left little doubt about the benefits his organization hoped to extract from the tsunami relief effort. One of Mr. Thamilselvan's goals is to get Canada to accord tax-free status to the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), a group identified by both CSIS and the Immigration and Refugee Board as a front for the Tigers' efforts to raise funds for terrorist operations. Mr. Thamilselvan told CBC radio he hoped for a meeting with the Canadian leader that would “vouchsafe the credibility” of the TRO. And a major pro-TRO propaganda effort was mounted during the PM's visit.
Sri Lanka's Sinhalese-dominated government is prepared to offer the Tamil-controlled areas in the north a significant degree of autonomy if a peace agreement can be reached. But that likely won't satisfy the Tigers' radicalized leadership. In a subsequent interview with CBC-TV, Mr.Thamilselvan stated that “we could have protected our people [from thetsunamis] more effectively if we had had the necessary resources and sovereignty in our hands.
The natural disaster has made us even more committed to our goal, which is ensuring for ourselves self-respect, peace and complete freedom” — in other words, total independence from Sri Lanka, and the creation of a new nations called Tamil Eelam. The Tigers' systematic assassination of moderate leaders and other rivals in the Tamil community demonstrates that they intend to set up a regime that will effectively be a dictatorship under their leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran.
Despite the Canadian government's refusal to classify the Tigers as a terrorist organization, they are terrorists par excellence. Before anyone had ever heard of al-Qaeda, they pioneered the use of suicide bombings, and have since killed thousands of innocent civilians in bombing attacks. To finance their terrorist activities, they have engaged in criminal acts on an international scale, including people smuggling and narcotics trafficking. They have also forcibly enlisted thousands of child soldiers into their ranks, providing them with cyanide capsules and instructions to commit suicide if captured.
In the wake of 9/11, there appeared to be serious prospects for achieving a negotiated peace in Sri Lanka. Given the reaction in Western countries to terrorism in general, the Tigers concluded they would no longer be able to obtain the funding and support from the Tamil diaspora that was essential to continuing their armed struggle. Five months after 9/11, they entered into a general ceasefire with the Sri Lanka government and began what appeared to be serious talks aimed at finding a peaceful solution.
By April, 2003, however, the Tigers had withdrawn from the talks and were again recruiting new members, including children, and replenishing their supply of weapons as well as assassinating Tamil opponents on a large scale. A major reason for their renewed confidence was likely the fact that Canada–whose Tamil community is a major source of funding — had failed to demonstrate it was serious about curtailing LTTE fundraising activities.
Canada's failure to label the Tigers as terrorists contrasts with the actions of Britain and the United States. It also contravenes the
recommendations of CSIS, which is the Canadian agency best suited to
determining the nature of militant groups.
The reason for the government's failure is clear. Through intimidation tactics, the LTTE exercises a considerable measure of control over members of the Tamil community. LTTE-friendly community leaders are willing to ensure that Liberal candidates win votes in Tamil-heavy urban constituencies, provided the federal government turns a blind eye to fundraising.
The federal government's claim that it is refraining from designating the Tigers as a terrorist group in order to not disrupt the peace process is disingenuous, to say the least. It had plenty of opportunity to take such action before the negotiations were launched in 2002 — but had no more stomach for it then than it does now. If Ottawa is really serious about contributing to a lasting peace in Sri Lanka, it should declare the Tigers a terrorist group and put a stop to their fundraising activities in Canada.
C National Post 2005
Martin Collacott was the Canadian high commissioner to Sri Lanka when the ethnic conflict began in 1983. He was subsequently ambassador to Syria, Lebanon and Cambodia. He lives in Vancouver.
January 26, 2005: Our Role In Tamil Terror
Our role in Tamil terror
Martin Collacott
National Post
Wednesday, January 26, 2005
In the wake of the Boxing Day tsunami that ravaged Sri Lanka, hope emerged that the shared relief effort might help the country's Sinhalese majority and Tamil minority end their civil war. Regrettably, a close reading of statements made by leaders on both sides — particularly the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, a.k.a. the Tamil Tigers — suggests these hopes are misplaced. It seems unlikely that peace talks will resume between the two sides. And Canada must bear a large part of the blame.
The roots of Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict go back to the 1950s, when demagogic Sinhalese politicians sought to gain political support at the expense of minority groups, particularly the Tamils. Whenever the party in power attempted to make meaningful concessions to the Tamils, the opposition undermined such moves by stirring up Sinhalese nationalism. Though the Tamils have won many rights in recent years, rivalry between the two main Sinhalese-dominated political parties continues to complicate resolution of the ongoing conflict.
On the Tamil side, the situation is even less encouraging. In his recent statements, the head of the political wing of the Tigers, S.P. Thamilselvan, has left little doubt about the benefits his organization hoped to extract from the tsunami relief effort. One of Mr. Thamilselvan's goals is to get Canada to accord tax-free status to the Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), a group identified by both CSIS and the Immigration and Refugee Board as a front for the Tigers' efforts to raise funds for terrorist operations. Mr. Thamilselvan told CBC radio he hoped for a meeting with the Canadian leader that would “vouchsafe the credibility” of the TRO. And a major pro-TRO propaganda effort was mounted during the PM's visit.
Sri Lanka's Sinhalese-dominated government is prepared to offer the Tamil-controlled areas in the north a significant degree of autonomy if a peace agreement can be reached. But that likely won't satisfy the Tigers' radicalized leadership. In a subsequent interview with CBC-TV, Mr.Thamilselvan stated that “we could have protected our people [from thetsunamis] more effectively if we had had the necessary resources and sovereignty in our hands.
The natural disaster has made us even more committed to our goal, which is ensuring for ourselves self-respect, peace and complete freedom” — in other words, total independence from Sri Lanka, and the creation of a new nations called Tamil Eelam. The Tigers' systematic assassination of moderate leaders and other rivals in the Tamil community demonstrates that they intend to set up a regime that will effectively be a dictatorship under their leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran.
Despite the Canadian government's refusal to classify the Tigers as a terrorist organization, they are terrorists par excellence. Before anyone had ever heard of al-Qaeda, they pioneered the use of suicide bombings, and have since killed thousands of innocent civilians in bombing attacks. To finance their terrorist activities, they have engaged in criminal acts on an international scale, including people smuggling and narcotics trafficking. They have also forcibly enlisted thousands of child soldiers into their ranks, providing them with cyanide capsules and instructions to commit suicide if captured.
In the wake of 9/11, there appeared to be serious prospects for achieving a negotiated peace in Sri Lanka. Given the reaction in Western countries to terrorism in general, the Tigers concluded they would no longer be able to obtain the funding and support from the Tamil diaspora that was essential to continuing their armed struggle. Five months after 9/11, they entered into a general ceasefire with the Sri Lanka government and began what appeared to be serious talks aimed at finding a peaceful solution.
By April, 2003, however, the Tigers had withdrawn from the talks and were again recruiting new members, including children, and replenishing their supply of weapons as well as assassinating Tamil opponents on a large scale. A major reason for their renewed confidence was likely the fact that Canada–whose Tamil community is a major source of funding — had failed to demonstrate it was serious about curtailing LTTE fundraising activities.
Canada's failure to label the Tigers as terrorists contrasts with the actions of Britain and the United States. It also contravenes the
recommendations of CSIS, which is the Canadian agency best suited to
determining the nature of militant groups.
The reason for the government's failure is clear. Through intimidation tactics, the LTTE exercises a considerable measure of control over members of the Tamil community. LTTE-friendly community leaders are willing to ensure that Liberal candidates win votes in Tamil-heavy urban constituencies, provided the federal government turns a blind eye to fundraising.
The federal government's claim that it is refraining from designating the Tigers as a terrorist group in order to not disrupt the peace process is disingenuous, to say the least. It had plenty of opportunity to take such action before the negotiations were launched in 2002 — but had no more stomach for it then than it does now. If Ottawa is really serious about contributing to a lasting peace in Sri Lanka, it should declare the Tigers a terrorist group and put a stop to their fundraising activities in Canada.
C National Post 2005
Martin Collacott was the Canadian high commissioner to Sri Lanka when the ethnic conflict began in 1983. He was subsequently ambassador to Syria, Lebanon and Cambodia. He lives in Vancouver.
